Moral Realism and Cross-Cultural Normative Diversity, Comment on Henrich et al. by Machery, Edouard et al.
Commentary on Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst 
Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, 
Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. 
Marlowe, John Q. Patton and David Tracer. 
Word Counts: 
Abstract: 59 words 
Main Text: 998 words 
References: 188 words 
Total Text: 1407 words 
Moral Realism and Cross-Cultural 
Normative Diversity 
Edouard Machery 
Department of History and Philosophy of Science 
University of Pittsburgh 
1017 Cathedral of Learning 
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 
USA 
+ (1) 412 624 5883 
machery@pitt.edu 
http://www.pitt.edu/~machery/  
 
Daniel Kelly 
Department of Philosophy 
Rutgers University 
Davison Hall / Douglass Campus, 26 Nichol Avenue 
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2882 
USA 
+(1) 732 932 9861 ext. 114 
dankelly@rci.rutgers.edu  
 
Stephen P. Stich 
Department of Philosophy & Center for Cognitive Science 
Rutgers University 
Davison Hall / Douglass Campus, 26 Nichol Avenue 
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2882 
USA 
+(1) 732 932 9861 ext. 131 
stich@ruccs.rutgers.edu 
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/  
 
  
Abstract: We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for 
moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental 
moral disagreement. As such, they support a moderate form of moral anti-realism, the 
position that for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and 
wrong. 
 
While previous evidence suggested that fairness norms vary little across cultures 
(Cameron, 1999), Henrich and colleagues’ important article summarizes a large body of 
evidence that in small-scale societies, fairness norms vary tremendously (see also 
Henrich et al., 2004). Certainly, neither the evidence nor its interpretation are completely 
beyond dispute. However, rather than quibbling about specific details of Henrich and 
colleagues’ work, we will draw out the implications of their findings for moral theory: we 
believe that these findings support a traditional argument against moral realism, namely 
the argument from disagreement. 
Moral realism is, roughly, the view that there is a fact of the matter about what is right 
and about what is wrong, about what ought morally to be done and what ought not to be 
done, and so on. Moral anti-realism denies moral realism. We focus on a moderate 
version of moral anti-realism, that is, roughly, on the view that for at least some moral 
issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and what is wrong (Brink, 1989; 
for an introduction, see Smith, 1993). 
One of the strongest reasons to reject moral realism comes from the existence and 
resilience of moral disagreements. For almost any moral issue, it is possible to find 
people who hold opposing moral views. By itself, of course, this does not entail that in 
such cases, there is no fact of the matter. After all, for any non-moral issue, it is possible 
to find people who hold opposing views. Though most agree that the earth is round, some 
believe that it is flat. This disagreement, however, does not entail – nor even suggest – 
that there is no fact of the matter about the shape of the earth. For, once provided with all 
the relevant empirical evidence, rational people will end up agreeing that the earth is not 
flat. 
According to moderate moral anti-realism, however, some moral disagreements are 
different: They may persist even after all the relevant facts have been agreed upon and 
taken into account, and all errors in reasoning have been corrected. Such moral 
disagreements are fundamental rather than superficial. Now, if there exist some moral 
disagreements that persist in the face of both correct reasoning and agreement on the 
relevant facts, then there seems to be no rational way to resolve such disagreements. The 
existence of such abiding standoffs supports moderate moral anti-realism, which holds 
there are no rational solutions to these moral disagreements because for these moral 
issues, there are no moral facts (e.g., Brandt, 1959; Mackie, 1977; Harman, 1977). 
We are sympathetic to this argument. However, it has been attacked on various fronts. 
For the sake of space, we focus on perhaps the most common reply. Moral realists often 
claim that moral disagreements are not truly fundamental, but instead ultimately rest on 
disagreements about nonmoral facts. Were this the case, all rational people should 
ultimately agree about moral issues once agreement is reached on all relevant nonmoral 
facts. Thus, one leading moral realist, the philosopher Richard Boyd, writes (1988, p. 
213): “(…) careful philosophical examination will reveal, I believe, that agreement on 
nonmoral issues would eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts of moral issues 
which arise in ordinary moral practice.” Indeed, we concede that clear examples of 
genuine fundamental moral disagreements—i.e. moral disagreements that do not rest on 
factual disagreements—are difficult to come by. However, in our view, Henrich and 
colleagues’ findings constitute just such a clear and genuine example. They provide clear 
cases of cross-cultural moral differences, specifically about fairness, that are difficult to 
account for in terms of differences in beliefs about nonmoral facts. 
Henrich and colleagues have gathered an impressive body of evidence that behaviors in 
one-shot ultimatum games (UG), dictator games (DG) and public good games (PGG) 
vary substantially across small-scale societies (Figure 2, p. 8; Figure 3, p. 10; Table 3, p. 
11; Henrich et al., 2004). Decisions in UG, DG and PGG are influenced by various 
factors, including personal interest, strategic considerations, risk aversion and fairness 
norms. Analysis can sometimes pull these factors apart. Thus, Henrich and colleagues 
show (p. 11-14; Figure 4) that the cross-cultural diversity in behavior cannot be entirely 
explained in terms of strategic considerations (beliefs about how to maximize one’s 
personal interest given one’s beliefs about others’ expectations) or culturally-variable risk 
aversion. Rather, across these 15 small-scale societies, subjects distribute windfall gains 
differently because they hold different views about fairness, specifically about how to 
fairly distribute such windfall gains. Henrich et al. note that this conclusion is consistent 
with ethnographic evidence (p. 23-24). Thus, differences in attitudes about fairness—a 
core element of morality (e.g., Rawls, 1971)—underlie the cross-cultural behavioral 
differences described by Henrich et al. 
In response, moral realists like Boyd might reply that members of the cultural groups 
under consideration believe that different distributions in the UG, the DG or the PGG are 
fair because they have different factual beliefs about the nature of the situation. If they 
shared the same beliefs about the nature of the situation, they would also agree on which 
distributions are fair. This reply is unconvincing, however. UG, DG, and PGG are simple 
experimental situations, much simpler than real-life decision-making situations. In the 15 
small-scale societies, the principles of these experiments are explained to subjects and 
subjects are also given ample practice in playing the games. Finally, their understanding 
of the experiments is probed (p. 15-16). Across cultures, then, subjects are provided with 
the same relevant, simple facts. It is thus unclear which factual disagreement could 
explain the cross-cultural moral disagreement in these simplified situations. 
The upshot for the debate between moral anti-realists and moral realists, at the very least, 
is that moral realists can no longer simply assert or assume that moral disagreements 
always rest on disagreements about nonmoral facts (for further considerations, see Doris 
and Stich, forthcoming, section 4). Henrich and colleagues’ findings lend substantial 
support to the moderate anti-realist claim that at least in some cases, moral disagreement 
is indeed fundamental. 
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